Supply Function Equilibria with Capacity Constraints and Pivotal Suppliers by Talat S. Genc & Stanley S. Reynolds
 
Supply Function Equilibria with Capacity 











Abstract.  The concept of a supply function equilibrium (SFE) has been widely used to model 
generators’  bidding  behavior  and  market  power  issues  in  wholesale  electricity  markets. 
Observers of electricity markets have noted how generation capacity constraints may contribute 
to market power of generation firms. If a generation firm’s rivals are capacity constrained then 
the firm may be pivotal; that is, the firm could substantially raise the market price by unilaterally 
withholding output. However the SFE literature has not properly analyzed the impact of capacity 
constraints and pivotal firms on equilibrium predictions. We characterize the set of symmetric 
supply function equilibria for uniform price auctions when firms are capacity constrained and 
show that this set is increasing as capacity per firm rises. We provide conditions under which 
asymmetric equilibria exist and characterize these equilibria. In addition, we compare results for 
uniform price auctions to those for discriminatory auctions, and we compare our SFE predictions 
to equilibrium predictions of models in which bidders are constrained to bid on discrete units of 
output. 
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1   Introduction 
 
  The supply function equilibrium (SFE) concept has become a widely used approach to 
study the exercise of market power by sellers in multi-unit auction environments. SFE models 
assume that each seller submits a supply function for divisible output to the auctioneer, who sets 
a  uniform  market  clearing  price.  Klemperer  and  Meyer  (1989)  (hereafter  KM)  characterize 
supply function equilibria in environments for which product demand is uncertain. They show 
that  there  are  multiple  equilibria  when  the  range  of  demand  variation  is  bounded.  Roughly 
speaking, these equilibria are contained in a range of prices between the Cournot price and the 
competitive price. 
The SFE concept has found its widest application in the analysis of wholesale electricity 
auctions. Many of these auctions are run as uniform price, multi-unit auctions in which power 
sellers submit offer schedules indicating their willingness to supply. Examples of applications of 
the SFE concept to wholesale electricity markets include Green and Newbery (1992), Newbery 
(1998), Rudkevich et al (1998), Baldick and Hogan (2002), and Baldick, Grant and Kahn (2004). 
These papers consider a variety of extensions of the KM model, including production capacity 
constraints, cost asymmetries, potential entry, multi-step cost functions, and forward contracting. 
  Recent assessments of wholesale electricity market performance have emphasized the 
role of the extent of excess production capacity in the market and the ability of firms to influence 
the market price by withholding production (see Joskow and Kahn (2002), Borenstein, Bushnell 
and Wolak (2002),  Perekhodtsev et al (2002), and Wolak (2009)). The term “pivotal firm” has 
been used to describe a supplier that is able to dictate the price in the auction by withholding 
some portion of its production from the auction. One or more pivotal firms are most likely to be 
present  when  demand  (or,  load)  is  near  its  peak,  when  available  production  capacity  in  the 
market is limited relative to the peak demand, and when firms’ capacities are asymmetrically 
distributed.  
  While prior applications of the SFE approach to electricity markets have considered a 
variety of extensions of the basic SFE model, these applications have not adequately addressed 
the impact of production capacity constraints nor have they examined the potential role of pivotal 
firms. In this paper we formulate a simple model for which the notion of a pivotal firm has a 
natural  interpretation.  We  assume  that  demand  is  uncertain  and  perfectly  inelastic  up  to  a   2
maximum price. We focus on the case in which firms’ marginal costs are identical and constant 
up to production capacity. In the symmetric model, firms have identical capacities as well as 
costs. In the asymmetric model, firms have differing capacities. As in other SFE models with 
bounded demand variation, there is a continuum of equilibria.  
  The  introduction  of  production  capacity  constraints  into  a  SFE  model  changes  the 
analysis in a fundamental manner. The SFE model without capacity constraints utilizes quasi-
concavity of firms’ profit functions and first-order necessary conditions to determine optimal 
price-quantity pairs along with the curvature of the equilibrium supply function. When a firm’s 
rivals have capacity constraints the firm’s profit function need not be quasi-concave in price. In 
addition to a locally optimal price-quantity pair associated with the SFE necessary condition, a 
pivotal  firm  may  have  a  global  profit  optimum  at  the  maximum  price,  or  price  cap.  By 
withholding output, a pivotal firm can unilaterally move the market price to the price cap. We 
examine  the  connection  between  pivotal  firms  and  the  set  of  supply  function  equilibria.  In 
symmetric and asymmetric versions of the model we show that the presence of pivotal firms 
alters  the  set  of  equilibria.  The  size  of  the  equilibrium  set  depends  on  observable  market 
characteristics such as the amount of industry excess capacity, the demand distribution, and the 
number  of  firms.  We  show  that  as  the  amount  of  industry  excess  capacity  falls  the  set  of 
symmetric supply function equilibria becomes smaller; the equilibria that are eliminated are the 
lowest-priced,  most  competitive  equilibria.  We  also  show  that  if  the  demand  distribution  is 
concentrated  near  its  maximum  value  then  there  are  asymmetric  equilibria  in  which  the 
maximum price occurs with probability one. 
           In prior analyses based on the SFE approach, neither a change in the demand distribution 
nor in the amount of excess capacity have any impact on the predicted set of equilibrium supply 
functions. This is the first paper in the literature showing that both of these factors do influence 
the  set  of  equilibria.  Relatively  competitive  supply  function  strategies  are  eliminated  as 
equilibrium strategies when pivotal suppliers are present. Other contributions of this paper are 
(1) a full characterization of the set of symmetric supply function equilibria for a model with 
capacity constraints and, (2) a demonstration of existence of asymmetric equilibria with price 
equal  to  the  price  cap  for  some  configurations  of  the  demand  distribution  and  capacities.   3
Furthermore we compare our SFE predictions to equilibrium predictions of models in which 
bidders are constrained to bid on discrete units of output. 
  Section 2 reviews the relevant literature. Section 3 describes the model formulation and 
explains preliminary results. In section 4 we consider the role of capacity constraints and pivotal 
suppliers in equilibrium predictions for a symmetric model. We show how the failure of quasi-
concavity of profit as a function of price changes the problem of finding an optimal supply 
response  to  rivals’  supply  function  strategies.  We  provide  a  complete  characterization  of 
symmetric supply function equilibria for all parameter configurations with a general demand 
distribution,  which  is  the  main  contribution  of  this  paper.  We  also  describe  two  types  of 
asymmetric equilibria that may arise. Section 5 provides a discussion of several issues, including 
asymmetric duopoly, increasing marginal costs, a comparison of SFE results with results from 
discrete-units bidding models, and equilibrium selection. Section 6 concludes.  
 
2   Background 
2.1  Pivotal Suppliers and Market Power 
Wholesale electricity markets are particularly vulnerable to supplier market power. These 
markets are often organized as auctions in which firms submit offer schedules. Buyers in these 
auctions typically have little or no price sensitivity, so that the price elasticity of demand is close 
to zero. For example, buyers may be electricity distributors that are obligated to serve whatever 
quantity (load) their customers request at a fixed retail price. Electricity production by power 
generation  firms  is  limited  by  capacity  constraints.  In  many  parts  of  the  world,  wholesale 
markets are linked together via a transmission grid. However, the ability of buyers to acquire 
power from distant generation firms may be limited by transmission capacity constraints. Taken 
together, these characteristics of wholesale electricity markets can yield significant market power 
for individual firms when demand is near its peak level. By unilaterally withholding output, a 
firm may be able to achieve a large price increase for its output, because of the combination of 
zero  or  low  demand  elasticity  and  limited  production  capacity  of  rival  firms.  For  example, 
Borenstein, Bushnell and Wolak (2002) estimate that 50 percent of electricity wholesale market 
expenditures in California in summer 2000 could be attributed to exercise of market power by 
generation firms.   4
  The concept of a pivotal firm embodies an extreme type of market power that may be 
present in wholesale electricity markets. Suppose that market demand is perfectly inelastic up to 
a  maximum  price,  or  price  cap,  and  firms  have  capacity  constraints.  If  the  market  demand 
quantity exceeds the sum of production capacities of a firm’s rivals with positive probability then 
that firm is said to be a pivotal firm. The firm is pivotal in the sense that it can move the market 
price to the price cap with positive probability by withholding output at prices below the cap. We 
develop a model in which the pivotal firm concept plays a crucial role in determining the set of 
equilibria. 
  The  Residual  Supply  Index  (RSI)  is  a  market  power  index  that  was  devised  by  the 
California Independent System Operator (see Sheffrin (2001, 2002)). RSI is calculated as the 
ratio of residual supply (total supply minus largest seller’s capacity) to the total demand. Using 
summer 2000 peak hourly data from the California Power Exchange, Sheffrin (2001) found a 
negative correlation between the Lerner Index and RSI. She finds that when RSI is about 1.2, the 
average price-cost markup is zero.  
         Wolak (2009) studies the performance of the New Zealand wholesale electricity market. He 
investigates  the  unilateral  market  power  problem,  and  in  particular  explains  how  pivotal 
suppliers emerge and exercise market power. He provides empirical evidence on the ability and 
incentive to exercise unilateral market power by pivotal suppliers. He writes, (on page 153), “We 
find that when a supplier is a pivotal its offer prices are higher by economically significant 
magnitudes.” He measures pivotal frequency of power producers in the New Zealand market. 
For example, he reports (on page 163), for each year of the sample period from January 1, 2001 
to  June  30,  2007,  that  “Meridian  (Energy)  has  by  far  the  highest  pivotal  and  net  pivotal 
frequency. For all but 2001, it was pivotal in more than 50 percent of the half-hour periods of the 
year. Next is Contact (Energy) with annual pivotal frequencies that range from 10 to 20 percent. 
Genesis’ annual pivotal frequency ranges from slightly more than 3 percent to slightly more than 
10 percent. Mighty River Power has the lowest annual pivotal frequency of the four suppliers.” 
  Concerns  about  pivotal  suppliers  are  the  basis  for  some  energy  policy  provisions.  For 
instance,  the  U.S.  Federal  Energy  Regulatory  Commission  (FERC)  may  block  a  generation 
company from charging market-based rates for energy if the company fails a screening test for 
market power. One of the tests used by FERC is the pivotal supplier screen; a generation supplier   5
is deemed pivotal, and therefore fails the test, if peak demand cannot be met in the relevant 
market without production from the supplier’s capacity.
1  
 
2.2  Equilibrium Models 
  Klemperer and Meyer (1989) formulate a model in which each seller submits a supply 
function for divisible output as a function of the market price. There is no private information in 
their model, but the level of demand is uncertain at the time sellers submit supply functions. A 
uniform market price is determined by the intersection of the realization of the demand function 
and the aggregate supply function. The necessary conditions for equilibrium yield a system of 
differential equations that equilibrium supply functions must satisfy.  If  the range of demand 
variation is bounded then there is a continuum of equilibria; maximum prices associated with 
these equilibria range from the competitive price to the Cournot price. 
  Green and Newbery (1992) applied the SFE model to analyze competition in the British 
wholesale  electricity spot market. This market  was run as  a uniform price  auction in which 
power sellers submit offer schedules. Green and Newbery argue that in a symmetric model, firms 
should select the symmetric equilibrium that yields the highest profit. Using demand and cost 
parameters to reflect conditions in the early years of the England and Wales wholesale electricity 
market, they show that at the most profitable symmetric SFE, the two dominant bulk electricity 
firms were predicted to choose supply functions that yield prices above marginal costs and cause 
substantial  deadweight  losses.  Their  SFE  predicted  prices  were  well  above  observed  prices. 
Wolfram (1999) performs a more detailed analysis of pool outcomes in the England and Wales 
market. She also finds that the most profitable symmetric SFE yields predicted prices that are 
substantially above actual pool prices.   
  Green and Newbery (1992), Newbery (1998), and Baldick and Hogan (2002) formulate 
SFE models that include production capacity constraints for firms. They argue, quite correctly, 
that if a solution of the SFE differential equation system violates any firm’s capacity constraint, 
then that solution cannot be a SFE (see Green and Newbery (1992, pp. 938-939) and Baldick and 
                                                 
1  The following quote is from FERC Order No. 697 (2007), pp. 18-19:  “The second screen is the pivotal supplier 
screen, which evaluates the potential of a seller to exercise market power based on uncommitted capacity at the time 
of the balancing authority area’s annual peak demand. This screen focuses on the seller’s ability to exercise market 
power unilaterally. It examines whether the market demand can be met absent the seller during peak times. A seller 
is pivotal if demand cannot be met without some contribution of supply by the seller or its affiliates.” 
   6
Hogan (2002, p. 12)). However, these papers neglect another effect of capacity constraints. Even 
when capacity constraints are non-binding for all firms at market clearing prices for a proposed 
vector of supply function strategies, these constraints have an impact on a firm’s profitability of 
changing its supply function. A firm may find it profitable to change its supply by withholding 
output and bidding up the price, given that its rivals are capacity constrained. Prior analyses of 
SFE models have focused on local optimality conditions for a firm’s supply response to rivals’ 
supply strategies. Local optimality conditions yield the system of differential equations that a 
SFE must satisfy. However, when there are  capacity constraints it is important to check for 
global optimality of a firm’s supply response. Rivals’ capacity constraints may yield a non-quasi-
concave payoff function for which local optima need not be globally optimal. We develop the 
implications of this observation in Section 4 below. 
  Using a formulation similar to ours, Holmberg (2008) assumes that demand exceeds total 
capacity with positive probability and shows that there is a unique symmetric SFE with supply 
functions that reach the price cap when output is equal to capacity. Our analysis assumes that 
demand is stochastic but never exceeds total industry capacity.. In Section 4 we show that the set 
of symmetric equilibria shrinks as total capacity falls, though in general, multiple equilibrium 
remain.  Our  assumption  that  total  capacity  exceeds  peak  demand  permits  our  results  to  be 
compared to results from discrete-units bidding models of electricity markets, such as Fabra et al 
(2006).  
  Delgado  and  Moreno  (2004)  provide  another  avenue  for  eliminating  multiplicity  of 
equilibria in a SFE model. They show that the only equilibrium in a supply function model with 
a  single,  certain  demand  function  is  the  equilibrium  that  yields  the  Cournot  price  when  the 
Coalition-proof Nash equilibrium refinement is used. However this result changes when output is 
subject  to  capacity  constraints.  Delgado  (2006)  shows  that  the  presence  of  sufficiently 
asymmetric capacity constraints may increase the number of Coalition-proof Nash equilibrium 
outcomes; the new outcomes involve prices below the Cournot price. 
  Fabra, von der Fehr and Harbord (2006) compare discriminatory versus uniform-price 
electricity auctions in which firms submit offers to supply one or more discrete units of output. 
Their model of a uniform-price auction shares many features of our model. We compare results   7
from their discrete units analysis to those from our analysis of supply functions with infinitely 
divisible output in Section 5.3.  
 
3  A Supply Function Equilibrium Model 
3.1  Model Formulation 
  We assume that the level of demand is θ, a random variable that is independent of the 
market price. The level of demand is distributed according to  ( ) F θ  with support,  , θ θ      , where 
0 θ θ ≤ < . We assume that the probability density function is strictly positive on the interior of 
its support. Demand is perfectly inelastic for prices up to an exogenous market reserve price,  p . 
This reserve price could represent either buyers’ maximum willingness to pay or, a price cap 
imposed by regulators.
2   
  There are n > 2 firms. We assume a simple cost structure in which each firm has constant 
marginal  cost  of  production,  c,  up  to  its  capacity  constraint,  where  0 c p ≤ < .  The  capacity 
constraint for firm i is  i K . Total capacity for all firms is, 
1
n
i i K K
= ≡∑ . Throughout most of this 
paper we assume that firms have equal capacities, with  i K k =  for  1,... i n = .  
   Each firm i is assumed to choose a supply function,  ( ) i s p , from the set S,  which is 
defined as the set of non-decreasing, right continuous, and piecewise-differentiable functions 
mapping  + R  into [0, ] k . Firms are assumed to select supply functions simultaneously prior to the 
realization  of  demand.  The  auctioneer  (or,  system  operator)  constructs  an  aggregate  supply 
function and determines a market clearing price based on the realization of demand. Let  ( ) p θ  be 
the market clearing price when the level of demand is θ.  If firm i submits  ( ) i s p , then i is 
obligated to produce up to  ( ( )) i s p θ when the level of demand is θ and will be paid  ( ) p θ  per unit 
for its production.
3 
                                                 
2   See von der Fehr and Harbord (1993) for a discussion of market reserve prices for wholesale electricity markets. 
3   Our uncertain demand formulation may also be interpreted as a model of time-varying demand with long-lived 
bids, as explained in Green and Newbery (1992). For instance, our model could be applied to approximate an 
electricity auction in which each firms submits a supply schedule for an entire day, and in which the day is divided 
into 48 one-half hour intervals, with a clearing price established for each one-half hour interval based on demand for 
each interval.  See Baldick and Hogan (2002) and Fabra, et al (2006) for discussions of short-lived vs. long-lived 
bids in electricity auctions.   8
  Right continuity of supply functions is more general than the assumption of differentiable 
supply functions that is employed in most SFE analyses.
4 Right continuity allows for two types 
of supply strategies that are important to consider when capacity constraints are present. First, it 
allows a strategy of offering a firm’s some or all of a firm’s capacity at the market reserve price. 
We  show  that  this  type  of  strategy  may  be  part  of  an  equilibrium  when  firms  are  capacity 
constrained. Second, it allows for a discontinuous jump in quantity supplied up to full capacity 
for prices above those on the equilibrium path of prices.  
Let  ( ) ( ) j j S p s p ≡∑   and  ( ) ( ) ( ) i i S p S p s p − ≡ − .  If  ( ) S p θ >   for  [0, ] p p ∈   then  we 
assume that the price is  p  when demand is θ and  ( ) S p  units are provided to buyers. Otherwise, 
a uniform market clearing price, ( )
m p θ , is established when demand is θ that satisfies  
(3.1)  ( ) min{ [0, ]: ( )}
m p p p S p θ θ = ∈ ≤ . 
It is possible that there is excess supply at a market clearing price. We assume a pro-rata on the 
margin  (PRM)  rule  for  allocating  excess  supply.  This  rule  is  commonly  used  in  electricity 
auctions. Under PRM demand is first allocated to offers below the clearing price. Next, the 
remaining demand (quantity demanded at the clearing price less supply quantity offered at prices 
below the clearing price) is allocated to firms according to a pro-rata rule. If 
0 p  is the clearing 
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0 ( ) ( ) i i p p s p s p − ↑ = lim  and  0
0 ( ) ( )
p p S p S p − ↑ = lim . 
 
3.2   Supply Function Equilibrium 
A supply function equilibrium (SFE) is a Nash equilibrium in supply function strategies. 
In  this  sub-section  we  provide  preliminary  results  on  equilibria  with  differentiable  supply 
                                                 
4   Right continuity is the analog of left continuity of a bidder’s demand function in a sales auction. Kremer and 
Nyborg (2004) allow bidders to use left continuous demand functions in their analysis of the effect of alternative 
allocation rules. Our interest is in the interaction of capacity constraints and supply strategies, rather than the impact 
of alternative allocation rules.   9
functions,  under  an  assumption  that  firms’  capacities  are  large  enough  so  that  production 
capacities have no impact on the set of equilibria.  
 
Assumption A1.  Each subset of  1 n−  firms has sufficient capacity to meet maximum demand. 
That is, ( 1) n k θ − ≥ . 
 
Discontinuities in supply functions are important to consider when A1 is relaxed, as we explain 
in Section 4 below. 
Consider the profit for firm i in the event that demand is θ, given that rival firm j chooses  
supply function  ( ) j s p ∈ S, for  j i ≠ . If the clearing price is p and firm i supplies the residual 
demand,  ( ) i S p θ − − , then its profit is: 
(3.3)  ( , ) ( )[ ( )] i i p p c S p π θ θ − = − −  
We seek a supply function  ( ) i s p  for firm i that has the property that the clearing price  p
maximizes  ( , ) i p π θ  in (3.3) with  ( ) ( ) i i s p S p θ − = − , for each possible θ. If its rivals’ supply 
functions are differentiable then the necessary conditions for an (interior) optimal price for θ  for 
each firm i yield a system of ordinary differential equations for supply functions: 
(3.4) 
( )





s p i n
p c
≠ = =
− ∑  
This is a simple version of the differential equation system that has been intensively studied in 
the SFE literature.
5  
  If all firms utilize a common supply function,  ( ) s p , then the system of equations in (3.4) 



















θ −   −




                                                 
5   This version is simple because there is no demand function term, due to perfectly inelastic demand, and because 
marginal cost is constant.   10
We  depict  these  supply  functions  in  Figure  1.  The  parameter  ' p   is  a  boundary  price, 
representing the equilibrium price for the highest possible demand realization, for a particular 
equilibrium.  Supply  function    ( )  defined  in  (3.6)  is  a  symmetric  SFE  strategy  for  each 
boundary  price  p c p ∈ ' ( , ].
6  Note  that  the  set  of  symmetric  supply  function  equilibria  is 
independent of the distribution of demand quantities.  














( ') [ ] 
The supply function solutions in (3.6) are a special case of results in Rudkevich et al 
(1998).  They  derive  SFE  solutions  for  a  symmetric  model  with  zero  demand  elasticity  and 
general cost functions (including multi-step marginal cost functions). 
  Following Klemperer and Meyer (1989), the necessary conditions for maximization of 
( , ) i p π θ  at each θ  are also sufficient if each firm extends its supply function in (3.6) linearly in 
p  for prices above  ' p  up to its capacity. However, this result depends critically on assumption 
A1.  If A1 does not hold, then ( , ) i p π θ  need not be quasi-concave in  p  and there may be a 
second local maximum at a price above  ' p . This point is developed further in section 4. 
  It  is  possible  that  there  are  asymmetric  equilibria,  in  addition  to  the  symmetric 
equilibrium supply functions in (3.6). Let  x s p i i = ( ') be the supply quantity offered by firm i at 
boundary price  ' p and let 
max x  be the largest of firms’ supply quantities offered at  ' p . Solutions 





p c p c
s p x
n p c n p c
θ θ −       − −





where  ' p  and  1 2 ( , ,..., ) n x x x  satisfy, 
 
(3.9A)   p c p ∈ ' ( , ], 
                                                 
6  Since we allow supply strategies that are right continuous, the Bertrand strategy of offering units at marginal cost, 
c, is also an equilibrium. Symmetric equilibrium strategies are of the form, offer zero units for sale for prices less 
than c, and offer y units for sale for prices of c or higher, where  /( 1) y n θ > − . 








= ∑ , 
(3.9C)   ( )
max ( 1) /
n n n x n θ
θ θ
θ
  − −   ≥
 
 
   
 
  The supply functions defined in (3.8) collapse to a symmetric supply function if firms 
have  equal  outputs  at  the  boundary  price.
7  Condition  (3.9C)  is  required  in  order  for  supply 
functions to be non-decreasing in price.  If  0 θ >  then asymmetric supply function equilibria 
exist; if  0 θ =  then the only supply function equilibria are symmetric equilibria.
8 
 
4.  Capacity Constraints and Pivotal Suppliers 
  In this section we relax the assumption that any group of  1 n −  firms has enough capacity 
to meet maximum demand. Instead we adopt, 
 
Assumption A2.   1 n k nk θ − < < ( ) . 
 
We say that firm i is pivotal conditional on θ  if ( 1) n k θ − < . When this inequality holds, firm i 
would  be  able  to  achieve  a  market  price  of  p   when  demand  is  θ   by  submitting  a  supply 
function with some portion of its capacity bid in at price  p , and sell at least  ( 1) n k θ − −  units. 
We use the term “pivotal firm” to describe a firm that is pivotal with positive probability. In this 
section we focus on the symmetric case in which each firm has the same capacity; in this case, if 
one firm is pivotal then all are pivotal. 
  In what follows we examine how the presence of capacity constraints alters the set of 
equilibria. Consider a modified version of the strategy defined in (3.6).  
                                                 
7 (3.8) is obtained by solving the system of linear differential equations (3.4) along with boundary conditions. For a 
derivation see Genc and Reynolds (2004) for two firms. They form an equilibrium since the profit functions are 
twice differentiable and strictly concave in price. The expression in (3.9C) obtained by taking the derivative of the 
supply function and equating it to zero.  
8 This corresponds to a result in Klemperer and Meyer (1989). In their model with downward sloping demand they 
show  that  asymmetric  equilibria  are  ruled  out  if  the  lowest  value  of  the  demand  shock  yields  zero  quantity 
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The modified supply function strategy in (4.1) defines supply quantities for prices both above 
and below the boundary price. In particular, (4.1) specifies that a firm produces output equal to 
its production capacity for prices at or above the boundary price. This is the most aggressive 
supply behavior possible for prices above the boundary price, and therefore yields the lowest 
possible residual demand for rival firms for prices above the boundary price. Also, note that if all 
n firms choose the supply function (4.1) and if demand is  θ  then the  market clears  at the 
boundary price,  p', even though there is excess supply at price  p'. This is true because the limit 
of  *( ) s p  as  p  approaches  p' from below is  n θ / , and the PRM allocation rule gives first 
priority to supply offers below the clearing price. 
  Suppose that a firm’s rivals adopt strategy  ∗( ), defined in (4.1) with boundary price,  ′. 
If the firm’s best response is to choose  ∗( ) with the same boundary price, then this strategy is a 
symmetric equilibrium strategy. In a lemma used to prove Proposition 1, we show that if the 
firm’s best response differs from  ∗( ), then its best response is of the following form:  
(a)  follow  ∗( ) for low prices up to some quantity, q, 
(b)  supply quantity q for prices in the interval,   ∗   ( ),  ) and, 
(c)  supply quantity k at the price cap. 
For  0 1 q n k θ ∈ − − [ , ( ) ] the expected payoff associated with this strategy is defined as, 
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where  p' is the boundary price associated with rivals’ strategy,  s *( ) ⋅ , quantities  1 2 3 θ θ θ , ,  are 
defined as,   13
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and prices are given by, 
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  The boundary price  p' is included as a parameter argument for payoff function  w( ) to 
emphasize the dependence of this payoff on the boundary price associated with the strategies 
used by rival firms. This payoff function also depends on other parameters, such as capacity per 
firm, the number of firms, and the demand distribution. The function  w q p ( ; ') is continuous and 
bounded in q for  0 1 q n k θ ∈ − − [ , ( ) ]. Therefore,  w q p ( ; ') attains a maximum value with respect 
to q,  for each boundary price    ∈   , ] : 
(4.3)    
0 1
max
q n k v p w q p
θ ∈ − − ≡
[ , ( ) ] ( ') ( ; ') 
 
Proposition 1.  Under Assumption A2 the set of symmetric equilibrium supply functions is 
given by  ( ) =
 
  
   
     
 /(   )
for   ∈   ,  ) with boundary prices in the interval  p p [ , ], where 
the lower bound of the interval is defined by, 
(4.4)    =     {   ∈   , ]: (  ) =   (  )}. 
Proof.  See the Appendix. 
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Prices above  ′ are outside the set of prices observed in equilibrium. The form of the 
supply function for prices above  ′ matters only in so far as it influences the incentives of rival 
firms. The specification of 
*(.) s  in (4.1) provides the lowest possible incentives for a rival firm 
to  deviate  from 
*(.) s ,  and  therefore  this  form  is  consistent  with  the  largest  possible  set  of 
symmetric equilibria.  The lower bound  p  of the interval of equilibrium boundary prices is 
defined in (4.4).  This lower bound is determined as the smallest boundary price  p' at which the 
function 
s w p ( ') crosses the function  v p ( ')  from below. The function 
s w p ( ') indicates the 
payoff per firm when all firms choose supply function  s *( ) ⋅  in (4.1) with boundary price  p'. 
This payoff function is independent of capacity per firm,  k . However, an increase in  k  does 
affect v p ( '), since a higher capacity per firm reduces residual demand for any one firm at prices 
greater than or equal to  p'. A higher value of  k  causes  v p ( ') to fall at each boundary price  p'
, and this “shift down” yields a lower crossing point with 
s w p ( '). This effect of an increase in 
capacity per firm is summarized in the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 2.  Under Assumption A2 the lower bound of the set of symmetric equilibrium 
boundary prices is decreasing in capacity per firm, k. 
Proof.  See the Appendix. 
 
  The set of symmetric equilibria depends on the number of firms and on the distribution of 
demand quantities, as well as on capacity per firm. We do not have analytical results for the 
impact of changes in n and  F θ ( ).  Instead we provide numerical results in Table 1 to illustrate 
the impact of changes in n and  F θ ( ) on the equilibrium set for an example. The table is based 
on demand distribution a F θ θ = ( ) ,for  0 1 θ ∈[ , ], where a is a positive parameter. A larger value 
of parameter a indicates that demand is more concentrated near its maximum possible of unity. 
Numerical results are based on the assumption that total capacity is held fixed at 125 percent of 
the maximum demand quantity. 
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Table 1 
Ratio of Minimum Boundary Markup to Maximum Markup 
for Symmetric Supply Function Equilibria* 
 
                  a (distribution parameter) 
                1         2          3__   
 
        2     45.0       51.0       55.6 
 
              n  3     17.1       20.5       23.2 
 
        4       4.0         4.7         5.3 
          ___________________________________________________________ 
* Table entries provide the value of,   p c p c − − ( )/( ), in percentage terms. 
 
For each value of n, the lower bound of symmetric equilibrium boundary prices rises as a 
rises.  That  is,  as  demand  becomes  more  concentrated  near  its  maximum  value,  relatively 
competitive supply strategies are eliminated as equilibrium strategies and the set of symmetric 
equilibria  shrinks.  Holding  both  total  capacity  and  a  fixed,  the  lower  bound  of  equilibrium 
boundary prices falls as n increases.  
  As in the model of Section 3, if  0 θ >  then there are asymmetric equilibria, in addition to 
the symmetric equilibria characterized in Proposition 1. The introduction of capacity constraints 
alters the set of asymmetric equilibria in two possible ways. Consider first asymmetric supply 
functions defined in (3.8). Obviously, output at the boundary price must be less than capacity for 
each  firm  (so  that 
max x k ≤ ).  In  addition,  asymmetric  supply  functions  defined  by  (3.8)  are 
equilibria only for boundary prices that satisfy a condition analogous to the condition inside 
curly brackets in (4.4). That is, a boundary price  p' associated with an asymmetric equilibrium 
must be high enough so that no firm would wish to switch to a different supply function that 
would yield clearing prices above  p'. 
The analyses of von der Fehr and Harbord (1993) and Fabra et al (2006) for procurement 
auctions with discrete units of output suggest a second type of asymmetric equilibrium that may 
arise. Suppose that the demand distribution is concentrated near the maximum demand quantity, 
so that the following assumption is satisfied. 
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Assumption A3.   1 n k nk θ θ − < < < ( ) . 
 
Under Assumption A3, a single firm is assured of positive residual demand at any price up to the 
market reserve price, for each possible demand realization.   
 
Proposition 3.  Under Assumption A3 there exist asymmetric equilibria in which: 
a)  one firm offers no supply for prices below the market reserve price, and offers its entire 
capacity at the market reserve price, 
b)  each of the other  1 n −  firms offer their entire capacity at some price below the market 
reserve price, and 
c)  the uniform market clearing price is equal to the market reserve price for each demand 
realization. 
 
Proposition 3 is based on the following two observations. First, the high-price firm has no 
incentive to deviate from its supply strategy as long as rival firms offer their capacity at or below 
price  p %   satisfying,  1 p c k p c n k θ − = − − − ( ) ( )( ( ) ) % .  Second,  the  low-price  firms  have  no 
incentive to deviate since each has sales equal to their capacity at the maximum possible price 
with probability one.  
  The asymmetric equilibria of Proposition 3 yield the highest possible industry profit; all 
potential surplus is extracted in the form of profit for firms. Note, however, that the distribution 
of  profit  may  be  quite  uneven  across  firms.  If  the  lowest  possible  demand  quantity  is  only 
slightly greater than capacity for one firm, then the high-price firm will earn profit that is a small 
fraction of the profit earned by each other firm in equilibrium.
9 
           Earlier in this section we showed that the set of symmetric supply function equilibria 
expands  as  capacity  per  firm,  k,  increases  (Proposition  2).  Proposition  3  indicates  that 
asymmetric equilibria exist with prices equal to the price cap if Assumption A3 holds. Suppose 
that Assumption A3 holds, and k is increased, holding the demand distribution and the number of 
                                                 
9  Note that the asymmetric equilibria of Proposition 3 rely on our definition of the set of supply strategies, which 
permits discontinuous supply functions.   17
firms  fixed.  Then  at  some  point  as  k  rises,  Assumption  A3  will  no  longer  hold  and  the 
asymmetric equilibria with prices equal to the price cap will no longer exist. 
 
5   Extensions and Discussion 
5.1  Asymmetric Capacities  
  Concerns about market power in wholesale electricity markets have often focused on the 
largest  firms  (e.g.,  see  Lave  and  Perekhodtsev  (2001)).  Firms  with  the  greatest  generation 
capacity  appear  to  be  most  likely  to  be  able  to  force  up  the  market  price  by  withholding 
production. However there is relatively little analysis of models in which firms have asymmetric 
capacities in the SFE literature.
10  An exception is a recent paper by Anderson and Hu (2008) 
that reports SFE results for particular configurations of asymmetric capacities and costs.  They 
propose a new numerical method to calculate asymmetric SFE using an approximation technique 
for solving differential equations. They implement their method on several numerical examples.  
  We focus on duopoly markets in which  firms  differ only  in capacities. We assume that 
firm 1 has more capacity than firm 2. We also assume that  1 2 2 K K K θ + ≥ > .  
  If 
1
1 2 2 K K θ > ≥  then symmetric supply function equilibria are feasible, since each firm 
has enough capacity to meet at least one-half of maximum demand. Symmetric equilibria are 
defined in Proposition 1, using  2 k K = . Proposition 2 indicates that the lower bound of the set of 
symmetric equilibrium boundary prices is decreasing in  2 K  for 
1
1 2 2 K K θ > > .  
There may also be asymmetric equilibria, depending on the value of θ  . If 
1
2 2 K θ < then 
the only possible pure strategy equilibria are asymmetric. Equation (3.8) specifies smooth supply 
functions that can be asymmetric equilibrium strategies when firms have different outputs at the 
boundary  price.  In  addition  to  the  conditions  in  (3.9),  strategies  would  need  to  satisfy  the 
following two conditions in order to be asymmetric equilibrium strategies: 
a)  1 1 x K ≤  and  2 2 x K ≤  
                                                 
10   Green and Newbery (1992) discuss equilibria for asymmetric duopoly. They write that it is, “… more difficult to 
solve  for  the  pair  of  (differential)  equations  for  the  asymmetric  equilibrium  than  the  single  equation  for  the 
symmetric equilibrium, and the rest of the paper will restrict attention to the symmetric case.”  Baldick and Hogan 
(2002) also consider asymmetries in capacities and cost functions. However they note that the differential equation 
approach of solving for supply functions may not be effective because the resulting supply functions often fail the 
non-decreasing property.    18
b)  The boundary price
  ' p  is high enough so that neither firm wishes to deviate to a strategy 
that yields prices above
  ' p . 
If 
1
2 2 K θ < then  condition  (3.9C)  requires  that  the  minimum  demand  quantity  satisfies, 
2 ( 2 ) K θ θ θ ≥ − , since the smallest equilibrium output for firm one at the boundary price is, 
1 2 x K θ = − .
11 
  There may also be asymmetric equilibria in which the equilibrium price is equal to the 
market  reserve  price  with  probability  one,  as  in  Proposition  3.  If  2 K θ >
  then  there  is  an 
equilibrium in which firm one submits a supply function with zero output for prices below the 
market reserve price and output equal to capacity at the market reserve price. Firm two submits a 
supply curve such that firm one has no incentive to offer output at lower prices than firm two 
offers its capacity. If  1 K θ >
 then there are asymmetric equilibria in which either firm plays a 
“high-price” strategy and its rival plays a “low-price” strategy. 
  We summarize the preceding two paragraphs as follows. If 
1
2 2 K θ <
 then existence of a 
pure  strategy  asymmetric  equilibrium  depends  on  the  support  of  the  demand  distribution. 
Specifically,  the  following  condition  must  be  satisfied  for  existence  of  a  pure  strategy 
equilibrium: 
(5.1)    2 2 min{ , ( 2 )} K K θ θ θ ≥ − . 
If (5.1) does not hold then a pure strategy equilibrium does not exist. It is possible that mixed 
strategy equilibria exist, but we do not attempt to identify or characterize such equilibria.    
 
5.2  Symmetric Firms with Step Marginal Costs 
In preceding sections we assumed that all firms have a common, constant marginal cost c 
for production up to capacity. Our approach can be extended to the case in which  firms have 
multi-step marginal cost functions. Rudkevich et al (1998) derive SFE results for a multi-step 
marginal cost model with identical firms. Genc (2003) examines the impact of pivotal firms on 
the  set  of  supply  function  equilibria  when  each  firm  has  a  two-step  marginal  cost  schedule 
                                                 
11 The condition,  2 ( 2 ) K θ θ θ ≥ −  is obtained by plugging n=2 and 
2
max x K θ = −  into (3.9C).  
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comprised  of  low-cost  (base  load)  generation  units  and  higher  cost  (peak  load)  units.  We 
summarize two key findings from Genc (2003). First, with rising marginal cost steps, even the 
most competitive symmetric SFE yields positive profits since market clearing prices are above 
marginal cost for low cost units. As a consequence, the presence of pivotal firms may not have 
any effect on the set of supply function equilibria. This is in contrast to the constant marginal 
cost case, in which the presence of pivotal firms always eliminates the most competitive supply 
function  equilibria  (the  lower  bound  on  equilibrium  markups  is  always  positive  if  there  are 
pivotal firms). Second, the fraction of total capacity that is comprised of low cost units has an 
impact on the set of supply function equilibria. By analyzing a series of numerical examples, 
Genc  (2003)  finds  that  the  lower  bound  for  the  SFE  initial  price  is  non-increasing  in  the 
proportion of total capacity that is comprised of base load units. 
 
5.3  Offers to Supply Discrete Units vs. Supply Functions 
  A  supply  function  equilibrium  formulation  provides  an  approach  for  characterizing 
supply  function  strategies  for  infinitely  divisible  output  in  n firm  procurement  settings.  The 
present paper focuses on how capacity constraints and pivotal suppliers contribute to market 
power in a SFE model. An alternative approach is to model procurement as a n firm game in 
which each firm submits offers to supply one or more discrete units of output. von der Fehr and 
Harbord (1993), Anwar (1999), and Fabra et al (2006) utilize this approach.  
  We compare our results for symmetric capacities to those of Fabra et al (2006), who 
consider a discrete units model of a uniform price auction with n firms, constant marginal cost up 
to  capacity,  perfectly  inelastic  demand  up  to  a  price  cap,  and  uncertain  demand.  Under 
Assumption A1, a discrete units model yields a unique price prediction regardless of the number 
of units per firm; namely, the Bertrand equilibrium with price equal to marginal cost. In contrast, 
a  SFE  model  has  multiple  equilibria  that  include  the  Bertrand  equilibrium  as  well  as  other 
equilibria with positive markups over marginal cost. Equilibria with positive markups in the 
divisible output model are sometimes referred to as “implicitly collusive” equilibria.  
Under Assumption A3, pure strategy equilibria of the discrete units model are described 
in Proposition 3; these equilibria yield price equal to the market reserve price with probability 
one.  These  are  the  only  pure  strategy  equilibria  for  the  discrete  units  model;  there  are  no   20
symmetric equilibria in pure strategies. Under Assumption A3, our model with divisible output 
yields the asymmetric equilibria described in Proposition 3, symmetric equilibria described in 
Proposition 1, and other asymmetric equilibria with smooth supply functions. Equilibrium prices 
for the divisible output model are either equal to or lower than those for the discrete units model. 
  If Assumption A2 holds, but not A3, then there is not a pure strategy equilibrium for the 
discrete  units  model.  If  each  firm  supplies  a  single  unit  of  output  then  there  is  a  unique 
symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium with offers strictly above marginal cost. If each firm is 
permitted  to  submit  offers  for  multiple  units  of  output  then  there  may  be  a  mixed  strategy 
equilibrium, but characterization or computation of such an equilibrium would appear to be quite 
challenging.  If  Assumption  A2  holds,  but  not  A3,  then  Proposition  1  describes  symmetric 
equilibria  of  the  divisible  output  model;  in  addition  there  may  be  asymmetric  equilibria  in 
smooth supply strategies. Expected payoff per firm in a symmetric equilibrium of the divisible 
output model is greater than or equal to expected payoff in the mixed strategy equilibrium for the 
single-unit offer model. 
 
5.4  Discriminatory vs. Uniform-price Auctions 
  A  discriminatory  (pay-as-bid)  auction  format  is  an  alternative  to  the  uniform-price 
format. Under Assumption A1 there is a unique pure strategy SFE under discriminatory auction 
rules.  The  unique  equilibrium  involves  each  firm  offering  their  capacity  at  a  price  equal  to 
marginal cost (see Wang and Zender (2002) for the case of a sales auction). Supply function 
equilibria under uniform-price rules include the equilibrium with price equal to marginal cost, as 
well  as  other  (implicitly  collusively)  equilibrium  with  prices  greater  than  marginal  cost.  So, 
under Assumption A1, SFE prices for uniform-price auctions are greater than or equal to SFE 
prices for discriminatory auctions. 
  Genc  (2009)  examines  supply  function  equilibria  for  discriminatory  auctions  under 
Assumption A2, with the additional assumption that demand is uniformly distributed. He shows 
that a pure strategy SFE does not exist. He characterizes a symmetric mixed strategy SFE in 
which firms mix over horizontal supply functions. This mixed strategy equilibrium is based on 
the security profit a firm can achieve by offering its capacity at the price cap; security profit is 
equal to:    ≡ (   −  )     {0,  − (  − 1) }]. Under uniform-price auction rules, a firm can   21
also achieve profit    by offering its capacity at the price cap. As a consequence, expected profit 
per firm in any supply function equilibrium under uniform-price auction rules is greater than or 
equal to expected profit per firm in equilibrium under discriminatory rules. A corollary to this 
profit result is that expected equilibrium prices under uniform-price rules are greater than or 
equal to expected equilibrium prices under discriminatory rules.   
 
5.5  Equilibrium Selection 
  Under  Assumption  A1,  the  symmetric  model  has  a  continuum  of  Pareto-ranked 
symmetric equilibria. If the lower bound of the support of the demand distribution is positive, 
then there are also multiple asymmetric equilibria that, for a given vector of boundary outputs 
1 2 ( , ,..., ) n x x x , are Pareto-ranked. Suppose that the amount of excess capacity is reduced, so that 
Assumption  A2  holds  and  A3  does  not  hold.  Then  some  equilibria  are  eliminated;  supply 
strategies that yield low prices and low expected profits are no longer equilibrium strategies.  If 
firms are able to coordinate on the most profitable supply function equilibrium then the fact that 
some  less  profitable  supply  strategies  are  eliminated  as  equilibria  when  excess  capacity  is 
reduced would be irrelevant for observed supply behavior.
12 However, there are two reasons to 
question the ability of firms to coordinate on the most profitable SFE. First, as noted in Section 
2.2, both Green and Newbery (1992) and Wolfram (1999) found  that the most profitable SFE 
predicted prices were substantially above actual pool prices for the England and Wales wholesale 
electricity market. Forward contracts and the presence of a regulator with anti-trust powers may 
explain some of the difference between actual and highest-profit SFE prices, but probably not all 
of the difference. Second, evidence from laboratory experiments on coordination games shows 
that human subjects consistently fail to coordinate on the most profitable Nash equilibrium in 
some environments (see Van Huyck et al (1990), and Devetag and Ortmann (2007)). Failure 
becomes  more  likely  as  the  number  of  players  rises  and  the  complexity  of  the  environment 
increases. 
  Suppose that Assumption A3 holds. By Proposition 3 there are asymmetric equilibria for 
which the price is equal to  p  with probability one. Expected profit for the firm that offers its 
                                                 
12  If  total capacity is low enough so that a shortage occurs with positive probability, as Holmberg (2008) assumes, 
then there is a unique symmetric equilibrium and the selection problem disappears.   22
supply  at  the  market  reserve  price  (the  “high  price”  firm)  in  any  such  equilibrium  is, 
( )( ( ) ( 1) )
H w p c E n k θ = − − − . If  ( )
s H w p w > then there is another equilibrium, the symmetric SFE 
with boundary price equal to  p , that yields an expected price less than  p  and that is not a Pareto 
dominated equilibrium.
13 Also note that continuity of   (∙) in the boundary price implies that if 




            The supply function equilibrium (SFE) model has been applied to numerous analyses of 
generators’ bidding behavior and electricity market power issues. The important role that pivotal 
suppliers play in wholesale electricity markets has been documented empirically. However SFE 
models in which pivotal suppliers can play a role have not been considered in the literature. 
  We examine the connection between capacity constraints and the set of supply function 
equilibria. We include production capacity constraints in our model to allow for the possibility 
that a single firm is pivotal; that is, the firm can unilaterally move the price to the market reserve 
price  with  positive  probability  by  withholding  output,  since  rivals  are  capacity-constrained. 
While other SFE analyses have considered capacity constraints, we argue that these analyses 
failed to fully account for the impact of these constraints due to a focus on local, rather than 
global, optimality conditions.  
  We characterize the set of symmetric supply function equilibria for a model with capacity 
constraints. We show that when the constraints satisfy a “pivotal supplier” condition, the set of 
symmetric equilibria is increasing in the amount of capacity per firm. We also show that the set 
of symmetric equilibria depends on the demand distribution and on the number of firms. This 
dependence  of  the  equilibrium  set  on  the  demand  distribution  is  in  contrast  to  SFE  models 
without  capacity  constraints,  for  which  the  equilibrium  set  is  independent  of  the  demand 
distribution. 
                                                 
13  Whether or not this payoff inequality holds depends on n, k, and the demand distribution. For example, suppose 
that   = 3,   = 3/8, and load is uniformly distributed with   = 0.8, and    = 1.0. Then   (  ) ≈ 0.246(   −  ) >
   = 0.15(   −  ).  Another possible disadvantage of the equilibrium with price equal to the price cap is that it may 
lead to an anti-trust or regulatory investigation of possible collusion. This issue is outside the scope of our formal 
analysis, but it may be a potentially important factor in some wholesale electricity markets that operate with a price 
cap.   23
  We  show  that  asymmetric  equilibria  exist  for  some  configurations  of  the  demand 
distribution and capacities. If the lower bound of the support of demand quantities is sufficiently 
high, then there are asymmetric equilibria for which the price is equal to the market reserve price 
with probability one. 
There are a variety of possible extensions of our analysis. More general cost functions 
that  better  approximate  costs  of  electricity  generation  from  various  plant  types  could  be 
introduced.  We  could  also  consider  the  role  that  price-sensitive  demand  might  play.  We 
conjecture that the spirit of our results would carry through to more general models. That is, 
production capacity constraints shape the set of equilibrium supply functions via their role in 
limiting rivals’ ability to respond to a firm’s high price-low output supply strategy. Although our 
model provides some tools to assess market power issues in power markets, we also did not 
analyze  the  likely  effects  of  other  factors  such  as  transmission  constraints,  and  uncertain 
congestion and outages on supply function equilibrium predictions in the presence of pivotal 




  The following lemma is useful for characterizing the set of symmetric supply function 
equilibria.  
 
Lemma.   Suppose that rivals of firm one choose supply function  s *( ) ⋅  in (4.1) for some 
p c p ' ( , ) ∈ . Let  s ˆ( ) ⋅  be a supply function chosen from set S by firm one, and define quantity q' 
by, q s p ' ˆ( ') ≡ . 
a)  If  1 n k q k θ − ≤ ≤ -( ) '  then expected profit associated with  s ˆ( ) ⋅  for firm one is less than 
or equal to expected profit associated with s *( ) ⋅  for firm one. 
b)  If 0 1 q n k θ ≤ < − − ' ( )  then expected profit associated with  s ˆ( ) ⋅  for firm one is less than 
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  Before providing a proof of the lemma, we explain its economic intuition. Part a of the 
Lemma deals with the case in which firm one’s supply function  s ˆ( ) ⋅  is high enough that market 
clearing prices are less than or equal to boundary price  p' for all demand realizations. Given that 
firm  one’s  rivals  all  choose  s *( ) ⋅ ,  the  choice  of  s *( ) ⋅   by  firm  one  will  yield  prices  that 
maximize firm one’s profit at each quantity θ , subject to the constraint that prices are in the set 
0 p [ , ']. As a consequence, expected profit for firm one associated with  s *( ) ⋅  must be at least as 
high as expected profit associated with s ˆ( ) ⋅ . 
  Part b of the Lemma deals with the case in which firm one’s supply function  s ˆ( ) ⋅  is low 
enough that market clearing prices are greater than the boundary price  p' for at least some 
values of θ . The situation is depicted in Figure 2, where  s ˆ( ) ⋅  is drawn as an upward sloping 
supply curve through  q p ( ', ').  Residual demand for firm one has zero price elasticity for prices 
above  p' up to  p . Firm one could increase its profit for demand realizations with clearing 
prices above  p' by pushing the price to the reserve price,  p . Firm one can achieve this by 
adjusting its supply curve so that it is vertical at  q' for prices greater than  p' up to  p , and 
offering its entire capacity for prices at or above  p . For prices below  p', the most profitable 
q p ( , ) pairs lie along the supply curve  s *( ) ⋅ .  However, some of these points involve quantities 
greater  than  q';  these  points  would  violate  the  constraint  that  the  adjusted  supply  function, 
s p q ( ; ') % , be non-decreasing in p. Firm one can increase its profit, relative to profit under s ˆ( ) ⋅ , by 
extending its supply function vertically down from  q p ( ', ') until the vertical segment intersects 
s *( ) ⋅ , and by following s *( ) ⋅  for prices below this intersection point. 
  This  Lemma  demonstrates  the  potential  complexity  associated  with  finding  the  most 
profitable supply function in response to rivals’ choice of a potential symmetric SFE strategy,   25
s *( ) ⋅ . Finding such a best-response supply function may be a daunting problem.
14 However, the 
Lemma implies that the form of a best-response supply function when rivals choose  s *( ) ⋅  has 
only two possibilities in our model. One possibility is that  s *( ) ⋅  is a best response to rivals’ 
choice of  s *( ) ⋅ ; in this event  s *( ) ⋅  is a symmetric SFE strategy. The second is that a supply 
function of the form  s p q ( ; ') %  in (4.2) is a best response to rivals’ choice of  s *( ) ⋅ ; this supply 
function  has  a  vertical  segment  at  some  quantity  1 q n k θ < − − ' ( ) .  Of  course,  in  this  event, 
s *( ) ⋅  is not a symmetric SFE strategy. This limit on the form of a best-response supply function 
greatly simplifies the characterization of the set of symmetric equilibria.  
 
Proof of Lemma. 
Part a) Under the hypothesis of part (a), market clearing prices associated with  ˆ(.) s  are less than 
or equal to  ' p  for each  [ , ] θ θ θ ∈ . Let 
*( ) p θ  be the market clearing price at θ if all n firms 
utilize 
*( ) s p  in (4.1): 
(A2) 
* 1 ( ) ( )( / )
n p c p c θ θ θ
− ′ = + − .  
Given that its rivals use 
*( ) s p  in (4.1), the profit maximizing price for firm one, subject to the 
constraint that price is less than or equal to  ' p  is 
*( ) p θ  for  [ , ) θ θ θ ∈ . The residual demand for 
firm one at θ if price is 
*( ) p θ  is 
* * * * ( 1) ( ( )) ( ( )) n s p s p θ θ θ − − = . So 
* * * ( ( ), ( ( ))) p s p θ θ  is the 
profit maximizing price-quantity pair for firm one at  [ , ) θ θ θ ∈ , subject to price being no greater 
than  ' p . Since market clearing prices associated with  ˆ(.) s  are no greater than  ' p  for all θ, 
*( ) s p  yields at least as much profit as  ˆ(.) s  for each  [ , ) θ θ θ ∈ . Therefore,  
*(.) s  yields at least 
as much expected profit for firm one as  ˆ(.) s  (demand θ θ =  has zero measure, so any difference 
in profit between using 
*(.) s  and  ˆ(.) s  at θ θ =  does not affect the expected profit comparison).  
                                                 
14  See Anderson and Philpott (2002) for a characterization of the expected payoff-maximizing supply function 
under fairly general demand, rival supply, and cost conditions. Their analysis is not directly applicable because they 
assume continuity of (residual) demand in price.   26
Part b) 
*(.) s  used by rivals satisfies 
*( ) s p k =  for  ' p p ≥ . Therefore, residual demand for firm 
one is,  ( 1) n k θ − − , for   [ ', ] p p p ∈ ; residual demand is completely price inelastic over this price 
interval. Define quantity demanded  ˆ θ  to satisfy  ˆ ( 1) n k q θ ′ − − = , or set  ˆ θ θ =  if,  ˆ ( 1) n k q θ ′ − − >
. Market clearing prices associated with  ˆ(.) s  are greater than or equal to  ' p  for  ˆ θ θ > , since 
there is excess demand at  ' p  for  ˆ θ θ > . That is, 
* ˆ ˆ( ) ( 1) ( ) ( 1) s p n s p q n k θ θ ′ ′ ′ + − = + − ≤ < . So, 
for each  ˆ θ θ > , firm one can move the market clearing price to  p  with no reduction in quantity 
sold. This change will yield at least as much profit for firm one at demand realization θ  as profit 
associated with  ˆ(.) s . Firm one can move market clearing prices to  p  for  ˆ θ θ >  by offering 
quantity q′ for  [ ', ) p p p ∈  and quantity k for  p p ≥ . These supplies are what  ( ; ) s p q′ %  prescribes 
for  p p′ ≥ .  
For demand realizations  ˆ θ θ ≤ , market clearing prices associated with  ˆ(.) s  are less than 
or equal to  ' p . If market clearing prices associated with  ˆ(.) s  do not fall below  ' p  then prices 
and firm one’s profits for  ˆ θ θ ≤  are the same for  ˆ(.) s  and  ( ; ) s p q′ % . Consider the case in which 
market prices associated with  ˆ(.) s  do fall below  ' p  for demand realizations  [ , ') θ θ θ ∈ , where 
ˆ ' θ θ θ < ≤ . Profit for firm one for  p p′ <  is,  











  − −
=   ′−  
    .                 
( , ) p π θ  is strictly concave in p for  [ , '] p c p ∈ . Fix  [ , ') θ θ θ ∈ . Let  ( ) p θ )  be the market clearing 
price at θ  if firm one uses supply function  ˆ( ) s p . Let 
*( ) p θ   
be  the  price  that  maximizes  ( , ) p π θ   at  θ ;  the  supply  quantity  associated  with  this  price  is 
* * * ( ( )) ( ( )) s p R p θ θ θ = − . 
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Case 1: 
* * ( ( )) ( ( )) s p q s p θ θ ′ = < ) ) . 
In this case, firm one  would make more profit by lowering the price and raising its supply 
quantity at θ  relative to  ˆ(.) s . But, since  ( ( )) s p q θ ′ = ) )  and  ( ) s p q ′ ′ = ) , this change in price and 
quantity at θ  would violate the constraint that the supply function is non-decreasing in p.   
Case 2: 
* * ( ( )) ( ( )) s p q s p θ θ ′ < < ) ) . 
In this case, firm one could increase its quantity to  q′ at θ  by adjusting its supply function to 
offer  quantity  q′  at  price 
1 ( ) ( ) p R q θ θ
− ′ = − % .  The  price-quantity  pair  ( ( ), ) p q θ ′ %   yields  more 
profit for firm one at  θ  than does  ( ( ), ( ( ))) p s p θ θ ) ) )  due to strict concavity of  ( , ) p π θ  in p for 
[ , ') p c p ∈ . For all demand realizations  θ  such that Case 2 applies, firm one can increase its 
profit by offering supply quantity q′ at price  ( ) p θ % .  
 
Case 3: 
* * ( ( )) ( ( )) s p s p q θ θ ′ < ≤ ) ) . 
In this case, firm one can achieve the profit maximizing price-quantity pair of 
* * * ( ( ), ( ( ))) p s p θ θ
, by lowering the price and increasing its quantity. For each demand realization such that Case 3 
applies, firm one can increase its profit by utilizing supply function 
*(.) s  for price 
*( ) p θ .  
 
Case 4: 
* * ( ( )) ( ( )) s p s p θ θ > ) ) . 
In this case, firm one can increase its profit at θ  by raising the price and reducing its quantity to 
* * * ( ( ), ( ( ))) p s p θ θ . 
 
The adjustments described in the four cases above entail offering supply quantity  q′ for  
1 * ( ( ), ) p s q p
−
′ ′ ∈   and  supply  quantity 
*( ) s p   for 
1 * [ , ( )] p c s q
−
′ ∈ .  This  is  the  supply  function 
prescribed by  ( ; ) s p q′ %  for  p p′ < .   ￿                  
 
Proof of Proposition 1. 
  
          We will suppose that (  − 1) rival firms choose  s *( ) ⋅  in (4.1) with boundary price  ' p , 
and examine a player’s best response. The first part of the proof involves characterizing the   28
expected payoff associated with a strategy of the form s p q ( ; ) %  in (A1), when rivals choose s *( ) ⋅  
in (4.1) with boundary price  ' p  . The payoff is a function of the quantity  q representing the 
level of output at the vertical segment of the supply function  s p q ( ; ) % . This payoff is given by the 
function  ( ; ) w q p′   as  defined  in  (4.2).  The  payoff  function  ( ; ) w q p′   is  continuous  in  q  for 
[0, ( 1) ] q n k θ ∈ − −   and  in  ' p   for  [ , ] p c p ′∈ .  By  the  Theorem  of  the  Maximum,  ( ) v p′  
(specifying the value when the payoff function  ( ; ) w q p′  is maximized with respect to output q) 
defined in (4.3) is continuous in  ' p  for  [ , ] p c p ′∈ .  
  Note  that   ( ) ≥  (0; ) = (   −  )     {0,  − (  − 1) }] > 0 =   ( ).  The 
inequality  ( ) >   ( ) indicates that strategy  s *( ) ⋅  is not a best response to (n – 1) rivals’ 
choice of s *( ) ⋅   when the boundary price is equal to marginal cost.     
  Consider a firm’s best response to (n – 1) rivals’ choice of  s *( ) ⋅   when the boundary 
price is equal to    .  Profit conditional on   for a firm when (n – 1) rivals choose  s *( ) ⋅   with 
boundary price    is, 
 
(A4)   ( , ) = (  −  )   − (  − 1) 
   
  
   
     
 
     . 
 
This profit function is strictly concave in    for    ∈   ,  ] and attains a maximum at 
*( ) p θ  
defined in (A2) for boundary price   . Prices 
*( ) p θ  are implemented by supply function  s *( ) ⋅ . 
In other words, supply function  s *( ) ⋅   is a best response to rivals’ choice of  s *( ) ⋅   when the 
boundary price is    . Therefore,   (  ) ≥  (  ). Furthermore, profit at θ  (as well as an interval 
of demand realizations below θ ) associated with 
*( ) p θ  and 
* * ( ( )) s p θ  exceeds profit associated 
with  (. ; ) s q %  at θ  for any  [0, ( 1) ] q n k θ ∈ − − . This follows because 
( ) / ( )( ( 1) ) p c n p c n k θ θ − > − − −  by Assumption A2. So,  ( ) ( )
s w p v p > . 
   Since  ( )
s w p′   and  ( ) v p′   are  continuous  in  ' p   for  [ , ] p c p ′∈ ,  ( ) ( )
s w c v c < ,  and 
( ) ( )
s w p v p > , there is at least one value of  ' p  in the interval ( , ) c p  for which  ( ) ( )
s w p v p ′ ′ = .    29
  The next part of the proof involves showing that  ( )
s w p′  and  ( ) v p′  cross at most once for 
( , ) p c p ′∈  . Suppose that  ( , ) p c p ′∈  is a boundary price for which 
*(.) s  is not a best response to 
(n – 1) rivals’ choice of 
*(.) s . Then there must exist some other supply function,  (.) s )  that yields 
more profit for a firm than 
*(.) s . Let  ˆ( ) p θ  be the market clearing prices associated with  (.) s ) . 
Let  y )  be expected profit associated with the strategy  ̂(∙). Therefore we know that  (  ) ≥     >
  (  ). Now consider a boundary price  ( , ) p c p ′′ ′ ∈ . We propose new market clearing prices, 
defined by, 
( ) ( ( ) )( )/( ) p c p c p c p c θ θ ′′ ′ = + − − − ) % . 
If rival firms use 
*(.) s  with boundary price  p′′ then the quantity supplied by each rival firm at θ
, 
*( ( )) s p θ % , is precisely the amount they would supply at θ  with price  ( ) p θ )  and boundary price 
p′. Define a new supply function, 
      ( ) ≡  ̂(  + (  −  )(   −  )/( " −  )). 
This supply function, when played against n – 1 rivals who use  
*(.) s  with boundary price  p′′, 
yields market clearing prices  ˆ( ) p θ  and the same quantities as  (.) s )  when played against rivals 
using 
*(.) s  with  ' p . 
  We  know  that  ( ) ( )
s v p y w p ′ ′ ≥ > ) .  It  is  straightforward  to  show  that  expected  profit 






) . This implies, 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
s s p c p c
v p y w p w p
p c p c
′′ ′′ − − ′′ ′ ′′ ≥ > =
′ ′ − −
)
 
 This result shows that if 
*(.) s  with boundary price  ' p  is not a symmetric SFE then 
*(.) s  
with boundary price  p p ′′ ′ <  is not a symmetric SFE. Furthermore, since we know that  (∙) and 
  (∙) are continuous and  ( ) ( )
s w p v p > , there exists a price   ∈ ( ,  ) such that   (  ) <  (  ) 
for   ≤    <   and   (  ) ≥  (  ) for   ≤  ′ ≤   . So, 
*(.) s  is a best response to 
*(.) s  for 
boundary prices    ∈   ,   ; conversely, 
*(.) s  is not a best response to 
*(.) s  for boundary prices 
   ∈   , ).   30
The last part of the proof involves showing that all symmetric equilibria are consistent 
with,   ( ) =
   
  
   
     
 /(   )
  for,    ∈   , ′).  A  symmetric  equilibrium  must  involve  interior 
prices  and  quantities  for    ∈ (   , ).  Quantities  must  be  bounded  away  from  capacity  in  a 
symmetric equilibrium because symmetric quantities must equal  / , which is less than k. Prices 
must be bounded away from the price cap because if all firms have price equal to the price cap 
for any  ′ <  , then price would have to be equal to the price cap for all   ∈    , ] (that is, the 
supply function would have a horizontal segment at the price cap), and any one firm would have 
an incentive to undercut the price slightly. Therefore, the price and supply quantity must be a 
local profit maximum for  , given rivals’ choice of supply function. This means that a symmetric 
equilibrium  supply  function  must  satisfy  the  ODE  (3.5)  for  prices,    ∈   , ′).  The  unique 
solution to this ODE is,  ( ) =
   
  
   
     
 /(   )
 for   ∈   , ′). Prices above  ′ are outside the set 
of prices observed in equilibrium. The form of the supply function for prices above  ′ matters 
only in so far as it influences the incentives of rival players. The specification of 
*(.) s  in (4.1) 
provides the lowest possible incentives for a rival player to deviate from 
*(.) s , and therefore this 
form is consistent with the largest possible set of symmetric equilibria.  ￿            
 
Proof of Proposition 2.  
  The  payoff  function  ( ; ) w q p′   also  depends  on  k,  capacity  per  firm.  ( ; ) w q p′   is 




( ) ( ; )
( )( 1)(1 ( ( ))) {( )( ( ) ( 1) ) ( ) }
( )( 1)(1 ( ( ))) ( ')( 1) 0
q w q p
p c n F q p c q n k p c q
k k




′ ∂ ∂ ′ = − − − − − − − − − −
∂ ∂
= − − − − − − − <
 
 
If  ( )/( 1) k q n θ < − −  then: 
3
3 3
( ) ( ; )
( )( 1)(1 ( ( ))) {( )( ( ) ( 1) ) ( ) }
( )( 1) 0
q w q p





′ ∂ ∂ ′ = − − − − − − − − − −
∂ ∂
= − − − <
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If  ( )/( 1) k q n θ = − −  then the left and right hand derivatives of  ( ; ) w q p′  with respect to k are 
negative. Therefore,  ( ; ) w q p′  is strictly decreasing in k. 
 
Consider the function  ( ) v p′  defined in (4.3). Since  ( ; ) w q p′  is strictly decreasing in k 
and the constraint set [0, ( 1) ] n k θ − −  has upper bound that is decreasing in k, the function  ( ) v p′  
is strictly decreasing in k. 
           The lower bound of symmetric Nash equilibrium boundary prices, p , defined in (4.4) is 
the boundary price at which  ( ) v p′  crosses  ( )
s w p′  from above. An increase in k reduces  ( ) v p′  
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Illustration for Lemma, part b 
Figure 1 
Equilibrium Supply Functions 
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